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Determinants	of	the	Cost	of	Electricity	Service	
	 in	PCE	Eligible	Communities	
 
Executive	Summary	
This	report	is	one	of	two	companion	reports	ISER	prepared	for	the	Alaska	Energy	Authority.	The	other	
report,	“True	Cost	of	Electricity	in	Rural	Alaska	and	True	Cost	of	Bulk	Fuel	in	Rural	Alaska,”	is	dated	
October	26,	2016.	 	 That	report	estimates	the	full	costs	of	providing	electricity	in	rural	Alaska,	including	
the	costs	of	subsidies	provided	to	lower	the	price	consumers	pay.	This	second	report	assesses	how	the	
costs	of	electric	generation	in	Power	Cost	Equalization	(PCE)	communities	are	or	might	be	affected	by	
three	factors	that	are	not	related	to	the	differences	in	electricity	generation	costs.	Those	three	factors	
are	the	organizational	structures	of	utilities,	postage	stamp	rate	design,	and	managerial	information	
available	on	energy	subsidy	programs.	
1. Organizational	Structures	of	Utilities	
Electric	utilities	in	PCE	communities	are	organized	as	cooperatives,	are	run	by	local	villages	and	
municipalities,	or	are	investor-owned	utilities.	 	 The	scale	of	these	utilities	varies	widely,	and	includes	
regional	utilities	that	manage	separate	electric	grids	in	multiple	communities.	 	 A	review	of	those	
organizational	structures	indicates	that:	
1.1. There	are	significant	differences	in	distribution,	customer	service,	and	general	and	
administrative	costs	(DCG&A)	across	utilities.	 	 These	differences	are	correlated	with	the	utility	
size	and	organizational	structure,	with	the	smallest	utilities	having	significantly	higher	DCG&A	
costs	per	kWh.	
1.2. Small	local	utilities	that	have	merged	with	larger	regional	utilities	have	benefited	from	reduced	
costs	and	professional	management.	 	 Incentives	to	encourage	small	local	utilities	to	join	
larger,	more	efficient	regional	utilities	should	be	considered.	
1.3. The	cost	of	borrowing	for	large	local	and	regional	electric	coops	remains	low	compared	with	
that	for	stand-alone	local	villages,	municipalities,	and	investor-owned	utilities.	
1.4. The	state	government	should	consider	allowing	a	return	on	equity	as	an	allowable	expense	
within	the	PCE	cost	of	service	[AS	42.45.110(a)]	to	enable	utilities	to	build	equity,	enhance	debt	
coverage	and	facilitate	the	expanded	use	of	private	capital,	and	reduce	dependency	on	limited	
public	capital	resources.	 	 This	private	capital	may	take	the	form	of	investor	capital	for	
investor-owned	utilities	or	member	capital	for	cooperatives.	
2. Postage	Stamp	Rate	Designs	
2.1. Postage	stamp	rate	designs—a	single	rate	for	electricity	for	some	set	of	customers—can	help	
reduce	costs	and	improve	affordability	in	smaller,	remote	communities	through	an	implicit	cost	
subsidization	from	customers	in	larger	communities.	 	 	
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2.2. The	subsidies	in	postage	stamp	rates	may	decrease	incentives	for	utilities	to	manage	their	
costs,	because	higher	costs	may	be	subsidized	by	postage	stamp	rate-making.	
2.3. The	increase	in	cost	in	subsidy-providing	communities	risks	inefficient	bypass	by	large	
commercial	or	government	users.	 	 This	could	increase	the	total	cost	of	electric	service	and	
leave	the	remaining	customers	with	higher	rates	and	diminished	affordability.	 	 Separating	
communities	into	rate	groups	according	to	their	cost	structure	may	mitigate,	but	not	eliminate,	
the	risk	of	self-generators	bypassing	the	local	electric	utility.	 	 	
3. Efficiency	in	Governance	of	Energy	Subsidy	Systems	
3.1. To	assess	whether	the	PCE	program	is	achieving	its	goals,	transparent	information	about	the	
allocation	of	the	subsidies	and	about	the	operation	of	the	subsidized	utilities	is	required.	 	 The	
companion	report	to	this	one	identified	some	issues	about	reliability	of	information	generated	
under	the	current	reporting	system.	 	 Improvements	in	the	reporting	requirements	could	
address	these	issues.	 	 A	common	issue	is	inconsistency	in	accounting	for	capital	that	state	and	
federal	agencies	contribute	to	utilities.	 	 Those	capital	contributions	include	both	grants	or	
low-interest	loans	to	finance	capital	projects	as	well	as	sources	of	short-term	government	
financing,	such	as	annual	fuel	loans,	emergency	loans,	and	write-offs	of	operating	loans	for	
troubled	utilities.	 	 If	capital	investments	for	generation	were	separated	from	other	capital,	
investments	to	reduce	fuel	costs	(such	as	wind	power)	could	be	assessed	more	directly.	
3.2. The	PCE	program	is	one	of	several	programs	that	subsidize	energy	costs	in	rural	Alaska,	and	an	
understanding	of	the	interaction	among	these	programs	is	required.	 	 An	annual	compilation	of	
all	state	and	federal	heating	and	electrical	subsidy	support	systems	by	community	would	
enable	better	understanding	of	both	individual	program	impact	and	also	the	collective	
programmatic	impact	of	the	subsidies	on	energy	affordability.	
3.3. Information	on	system	reliability,	usually	measured	as	outage	hours,	is	required	to	fully	assess	
utility	performance.	
3.4. Currently,	there	is	no	information	on	how	well	the	PCE	program	and	other	energy	subsidy	
programs	in	rural	Alaska	target	families	and	communities	that	face	the	greatest	energy	
affordability	challenges.	 	 Because	of	limitations	on	income	data	in	small	rural	Alaska	
communities,	assessing	how	well	subsidies	are	targeted	may	be	challenging.	 	 However,	in	light	
of	general	information	that	energy	subsidies	are	often	inefficient	at	poverty	reduction,	this	is	an	
important	question.	
3.5. The	environmental	impact	of	energy	subsidies	for	rural	Alaska,	including	the	PCE	program,	
through	CO2	emissions	and	PM	2.5	emissions,	has	not	been	assessed.		 	
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Determinants	of	the	Cost	of	Electricity	Service	
	 in	PCE	Eligible	Communities	
	
I.	 	 Background	
Alaska	has	provided	significant	funds	to	help	reduce	the	burden	of	energy	costs	in	rural	Alaska.	 	 Under	
the	Power	Cost	Equalization	(PCE)	program,	the	cost	of	the	first	500	kWh	of	electric	usage	by	residential	
customers	may	be	subsidized	by	the	funds	from	the	PCE	Endowment,	if	certain	criteria	are	met.	 	 In	
2014,	the	PCE	program	provided	$39.6	million	in	disbursements	to	utilities	that	served	over	82,000	
customers	in	190	communities.	 	 Particularly	in	the	context	of	Alaska’s	current	budget	challenges,	there	
may	be	reason	to	assess	how	efficiently	programs	such	as	PCE	are	achieving	their	stated	purposes.	 	
This	report	provides	evidence	that	contributes	to	such	an	assessment	by	examining	three	specific	issues:	 	 	
• How	alternative	organizational	structures	affect	the	costs	of	electric	services	
• Potential	impacts	of	cross-subsidies	through	“postage	stamp”	rate	designs	
• Quality	of	the	evidence	available	on	efficiency	of	subsidy	programs	
	
II.	Impact	of	alternative	utility	organizational	structures	on	costs	
The	PCE	provides	funds	to	certain	high-cost	utilities.	Theses	utilities	have	significant	differences	in	
organizational	structure.	Some	are	cooperatives,	some	are	municipal	or	village	agencies,	and	some	are	
investor-owned	utilities	(IOUs.)	These	utilities	vary	widely	in	size.	In	two	cases,	Alaska	Power	Company	
(APC)	and	Alaska	Village	Electric	Cooperative	(AVEC),	a	single	entity	runs	multiple	utilities	that	are	not	
interconnected.	In	this	report,	we	call	companies	or	cooperatives	that	manage	multiple	local	utilities	
that	are	not	interconnected	into	a	single	grid	“regional”	utilities.	The	cost	of	electric	service	varies	widely	
in	rural	Alaska	among	these	different	utilities,	and	this	section	attempts	to	determine	if	there	are	any	
differences	in	costs	that	seem	to	be	correlated	with	differences	in	organizational	structure.	 	 	
	
II.	A.	 	 Compare	productivity	between	organizational	structures	
This	section	uses	the	most	recently	available	cost	data	from	PCE	annual	reports,	audited	financials,	and	
rate	cases	to	compare	costs.	 	 This	analysis	focuses	particularly	on	the	sum	of	distribution	costs,	
customer	service	costs,	and	general	and	administrative	costs	(DCG&A)	per	kWh.	 	 These	are	arguably	
the	most	directly	comparable	costs	across	different	utilities.	 	 The	two	other	significant	components	of	
costs	are	power	production	costs	and	capital	costs.	 	 Power	production	costs	and	capital	costs	depend	
heavily	on	the	available	generation	alternatives.	 	 For	example,	a	utility	with	significant	hydroelectric	
generation	capacity	could	have	much	lower	fuel	costs.	 	 Subsidies	for	investments	in	generating	
facilities	and	related	infrastructure	(such	as	fuel	storage	subsidies)	can	significantly	affect	capital	costs.	 	 	
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Figure	1	plots	the	expenses	for	distribution,	customer	service,	and	general	and	administrative	(DCG&A)	
for	the	utilities	that	qualified	for	PCE	payments	in	2012-16	against	utility	size,	as	measured	by	kWh	
generation.	 	 It	is	clear	that	DCG&A	expenses	vary	significantly	across	utilities.	 	 These	data	indicate	
that:	
• The	DCG&A	expense	for	communities	with	more	than	6	million	kWh	per	year	have	median	and	
mean	values	in	the	range	of	$.06-$.07/kWh.	 	 DCG&A	costs	range	from	a	low	of	$.02/kWh	to	a	high	
of	$.135/kWh.	
• The	DCG&A	expense	for	communities	with	less	than	6	million	kWh	per	year	are	widely	dispersed	
between	$.06/kWh	and	$.40/kWh.	 	 The	median	value	is	$.088/kWh	and	the	mean	is	$.125/kWh.	
• The	most	efficient	small	utilities	(less	than	6	million	kWh	per	year)	can	provide	DCG&A	at	a	cost	in	
the	range	of	$.06/kWh.	 	 This	includes	some	communities	that	provide	less	than	1	million	kWh	per	
year.	
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Figure	2	focuses	on	those	communities	that	generate	less	than	6	million	kWh	per	year.	 	 When	focusing	
on	these	communities,	we	can	see	the	following	distinction:	
	
• Both	regional	coops	and	regional	investor-owned	utilities	that	serve	small	communities	have	DCG&A	
expenses	in	the	range	of	$.06/kWh	to	$.08/kWh.	 	 	
• City/borough	utilities,	village	utilities,	local	coops,	and	local	IOUs	tend	to	have	higher	DCG&A	
expenses,	with	a	mean	of	$.17/kWh	and	a	median	of	$.14/kWh.	
Figure	3	compares	productivity	between	and	within	organizational	structures,	regardless	of	the	level	of	
generation.	 	 The	number	of	communities	served	by	each	category	is	indicated	by	“n=”.	 	 Figure	3	
indicates:	
• Regional	coops	have	the	lowest	median	DCG&A	expense	of	$.065/kWh.	 	 Regional	IOUs	have	
DCG&A	expenses	of	$.077/kWh.	 	 The	utilities	served	by	regional	coops	provide	an	average	of	2.0	
million	kWh	per	year	in	each	community.	 	 Regional	IOUs	provide	an	average	of	2.5	million	kWh	per	
year	in	each	community	served.	
• Local	community	coops	tend	to	serve	larger	communities	(12	million	kWh	per	year	average.)	They	
have	a	higher	median	expense	($.083/kWh)	compared	to	regional	IOUs	($.077/kWh)	but	a	lower	
kWh	weighted	average	($.074/kWh)	than	the	regional	IOUs	($.079/kWh.)	
• The	other	organizational	structures	have	markedly	higher	median	costs	to	serve	rural	communities.	
Their	costs	range	from	$.11/kWh	for	city/boroughs	to	$.16/kWh	to	$.18/kWh	for	stand-alone	
villages	and	investor-owned	utilities.	
Larger	regional	coops	and	larger	regional	investor-owned	utilities	tend	to	be	more	efficient	at	serving	
small	and	larger	rural	communities,	as	compared	to	other	organizational	structures.	 	 The	most	efficient	
large	regional	coop,	AVEC,	includes	a	large	regional	hub	(Bethel)	and	dozens	of	smaller	villages.	 	 The	
consolidation	of	small	regional	coops,	investor-owned	utilities,	and	stand-alone	coops	into	regional	
organizational	structure	would	appear	to	offer	significant	opportunities	to	reduce	the	cost	of	
distribution,	customer	service,	and	general	and	administrative	functions.	
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Figure	4	examines	the	relationship	between	productivity	(measured	as	DCG&A	costs	per	kWh)	and	
organization	type	of	utility.	 	 Note	that	the	vertical	scale	for	Figure	4	represents	the	size	of	the	utility,	
and	the	horizontal	axis	are	“bins”	based	on	DCG&A	cost	per	kWh.	 	
The	high	productivity	(low	DCG&A	cost	per	kWh)	utilities	are	Cordova	Electric	Coop	and	Nome	Joint	
Utilities,	at	$.02/kWh.	 	 Cordova	and	Nome	are	relatively	large	regional	hubs	with	annual	kWh	sales	on	
the	order	of	ten	times	that	of	mid-size	villages.	 	 The	next	cost	cluster,	with	DCG&A	costs	in	the	
$.05/kWh	to	$.06/kWh	bins	include:	
• I.N.N.	(Iliamna,	Newhalen,	Nondalton)–	local	coop	
• Manokotak	-	village	
• AVEC	(Alaska	Village	Electric	Cooperative)–	regional	coop	
• APC	(Alaska	Power	Company)	–	regional	investor-owned	utility	(IOU)	
• Kotzebue	–	local	coop	
• Buckland,	King	Cove,	Unalaska	-	municipal	
• Gustavus	–	local	investor-owned	utility	(IOU)	
	
I.N.N.,	which	we’ve	characterized	as	a	local	coop	(due	to	the	relative	proximity	of	its	small	number	of	
communities)	with	3	million	kWh	reports	DCG&A	expenses	of	$.058/kWh.	 	 AVEC,	which	serves	a	large	
regional	hub	(Bethel)	and	dozens	of	small	to	mid-size	villages,	is	relatively	efficient	with	DCG&A	costs	in	
the	$.06-$.07/kWh	range.	
	
Table	1	presents	a	spreadsheet	that	examines	the	impact	of	AVEC’s	acquisition	of	the	Bethel	utility	in	
2014.	 	 That	acquisition	led	to	an	18%	reduction	in	DCG&A/kWh.	 	 AVEC’s	experience	suggests	that	
regionalization	can	yield	significant	economies	of	scale	in	DCG&A	functions.	 	 After	the	acquisition	of	
Bethel	in	2014,	AVEC	DCG&A/kWh	fell	to	the	point	that	it	is	6%	below	that	of	APC	in	FY2015.	 	 APC	may	
see	analogous	productivity	improvements	following	the	integration	of	Gustavus	into	its	family	of	
communities	served.	
	
This	analysis	provides	an	important	insight	into	the	costs	of	electricity	in	rural	Alaska.	 	 The	common	
wisdom	is	that	these	differences	are	driven	mostly	by	differences	in	the	costs	of	fuel	and	in	the	scale	of	
generation.	 	 This	analysis	shows	that	non-generation	costs	are,	in	fact,	a	major	explanation	for	the	cost	
differences.	 	 This	analysis	strongly	suggests	that	total	DCG&A	expenses	per	kWh	for	rural	Alaska	could	
be	significantly	reduced	through	consolidation	among	the	smallest	utilities.	 	 The	issue	of	high	DCG&A	
costs	for	some	utilities	might	also	be	addressed	in	the	subsidy	determination	process	by	setting	a	per	
kWh	cap	on	those	expenses	or	differentially	reimbursing	DCG&A	costs	above	some	level.	 	 Figure	5	
groups	small	utilities	by	their	DCG&A	costs	per	kWh,	in	one-cent	increments,	and	uses	the	data	from	
Figure	4	to	estimate	the	possible	cost	savings	that	might	be	realized	were	all	of	the	local	stand-alone	
utilities	(village,	investor-owned,	and	municipal)	with	DCG&A	costs	above	$.07/kWh	able	to	achieve	
$.07/kWh	by	joining	a	large	regional	coop.	 	 The	estimated	annual	cost	savings	approaches	$15	million	
per	year,	which	is	large	relative	to	the	2014	total	PCE	subsidies	of	about	$40	million.	
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Table	1.	Review	of	Drivers	of	AVEC	and	APC	Cost	Productivity	
	 	 	 	(from	Annual	PCE	Cost-Support	filings)	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Description	
FY	2012	 FY	2013	 FY	2014	 FY	2015	 Percent	change,	
2012	-	2015	
Total	Power	Production	Expense	 	 $9,431,983	 	 	 $9,575,802	 	 	 $8,595,848	 	 	 $11,234,966	 	
	Distribution	Expense	(O&M)	 	 $1,235,348	 	 	 $1,251,252	 	 	 $1,164,608	 	 	 $1,343,691	 	
	Customer	Account	Expense	 	 $1,468,554	 	 	 $1,610,242	 	 	 $1,690,780	 	 	 $2,693,370	 	
	General	and	Administrative	 	 $3,240,615	 	 	 $2,899,721	 	 	 $3,078,979	 	 	 $3,349,366	 	
	Allowable	Fixed	Costs	 	 $4,458,137	 	 	 $3,974,548	 	 	 $4,387,123	 	 	 $4,987,352	 	
	Total	Costs	 	 $19,834,637	 	 	 $19,311,565	 	 	 $18,917,338	 	 	 $23,608,745	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	Distribution,	Customer	Account	and	G&A	 	 $5,944,517	 	 	 $5,761,215	 	 	 $5,934,367	 	 	 $7,386,427	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	Total	kWh	Sales	(unadjusted)	 	 74,080,714	 	 	 73,721,925	 	 	 104,428,156	 	 	 112,845,034	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	Distribution,	Customer	Account	and	G&A	per	kWh	 	 $0.0802	 	 	 $0.0781	 	 	 $0.0568	 	 	 $0.0655	 	 -18.4%	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
Includes	Bethel	
part	year	
Includes	Bethel	
full	year	
	Total	Cost	per	kWh	 	 $0.268	 	 	 $0.262	 	 	 $0.181	 	 	 $0.209	 	
	Distribution,	Customer	Account	and	G&A	 	 $0.080	 	 	 $0.078	 	 	 $0.057	 	 	 $0.065	 	
	Power	Production	and	Fixed	Cost	Expense	per	kWh	 	 $0.187	 	 	 $0.184	 	 	 $0.124	 	 	 $0.144	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	Compare	to	APC:	
	 	 	 	 	APC	DCG&A	per	kWh	2015	(U-14-002)	
	 	 	
	 $0.0696	 	
	AVEC	DCG&A	per	kWh	2016	
	 	 	
	 $0.0655	 	
	Percent	difference,	AVEC	compare	to	APC	
	 	 	
-5.9%	
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II.	B.	 	 Attracting	private	capital	to	the	Alaska	electric	utility	sector	
As	discussed	above,	regional	utilities—and	especially	large	regional	cooperatives	that	provide	service	to	
a	range	of	rural	communities—have	lower	DCG&A	costs	per	kWh.	 	 This	section	analyses	the	extent	to	
which	these	larger,	regional	utilities	are	also	able	to	achieve	a	lower	cost	of	capital.	
The	analysis	of	the	cost	of	capital	for	rural	Alaska	utilities	is	complicated	by	the	large	state	and	federal	
grants	of	capital	for	infrastructure	made	to	many	of	these	communities.	 	 Moreover,	state	and	federal	
programs	also	absorb	some	of	the	operational	risks	associated	with	small	rural	utilities	through	various	
types	of	financial	rescue	of	troubled	utilities.	 	 	
But	even	with	the	possibility	of	outside	financial	rescue,	utilities	in	small	villages	present	significant	risk	
and	cash	flow	volatility.	 	 This	translates	into	significant	challenges	to	attracting	private	capital,	so	the	
equity	returns	required	to	attract	private	investment	in	small	stand-alone	utilities	may	exceed	20%.	 	
Small	utilities	are	also	much	less	able	to	access	debt	markets.	 	 A	large	regional	coop	can	achieve	much	
more	stable	financial	performance	and	can	be	expected	save	as	much	as	12%	(1200	basis	points)	on	the	
cost	of	capital.	 	 This	lower	capital	cost	reflects	an	estimated	4.5%	(450	basis	point)	reduction	in	the	cost	
of	equity	and	a	much	heavier	reliance	on	lower	cost	debt	financing.	 	 This	presents	a	significant	
opportunity	for	smaller	communities	to	improve	their	access	to	private	capital	by	joining	larger	regional	
governance	and	management	structures.	 	 	
Rate-making	for	investor-owned	utilities	includes	an	allowance	for	the	cost	of	capital,	including	both	
interest	costs	and	a	return	on	equity.	 	 Electric	utilities	outside	rural	Alaska	typically	have	made	large,	
long-term	investments	in	generation,	transmission,	and	distribution.	 	 They	are	therefore	very	
capital-intensive,	and	the	cost	of	capital	can	approach	or	exceed	50%	of	rates.	 	 Because	of	the	state	
and	federal	capital	grants	to	utilities	in	rural	Alaska,	the	cost	of	capital	is	a	smaller	share	of	total	costs.	 	
Probably	because	of	the	importance	of	externally-provided	capital	in	rural	Alaska,	the	state	statute	that	
defines	PCE	subsidy	calculations	[AS	42.45.110(a)]	does	not	allow	a	return	on	equity.	 	 To	the	extent	
that	PCE	subsidies	determine	the	financial	condition	of	rural	utilities,	not	including	a	return	on	equity	
discourages	private	investment	and	generally	affects	decisions	about	financing.	 	 Allowing	a	return	on	
equity	in	the	PCE	program	would	encourage	utilities	to	improve	debt	service	coverage	ratios	and	to	
build	equity	that	can	lower	borrowing	costs.	 	 Such	changes	would	improve	the	risk/reward	profile	for	
utility	service	to	small	and	mid-sized	rural	communities	and	thereby	improve	their	attractiveness	to	
private	capital.	
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Cost	of	Capital	Estimates	
We	develop	estimates	of	the	cost	of	capital	for	rural	Alaska	utilities	using	the	methodology	of	Duff	and	
Phelps	(2016	Valuation	Handbook-Guide	to	Cost	of	Capital.)	 	 We	compare	the	cost	of	equity	for	small,	
local	utilities	to	regional	utilities	across	organizational	types.	 	 The	merger	of	small	stand-alone	village	
utilities	with	a	large	regional	coop	yields	an	estimated	450-basis	point	(4.5	percent)	reduction	in	the	
estimated	cost	of	equity	(see	Figure	6).	 	 On	a	$1	million	investment,	a	community	served	by	a	regional	
coop	would	save	$830,000	over	20	years	on	return	on	equity,	as	compared	with	a	community	served	by	
a	small	stand-alone	utility.	
Figure	6	shows	the	data	used	to	estimate	this	450-basis	point	difference	in	the	cost	of	equity.	We	
created	pro	forma	financials	for	seven	representative	types	of	utilities.	 	 The	pro	forma	sets	of	financials	
for	the	most	and	least	expensive	utilities,	a	village	scale	utility,	and	a	large	regional	cooperative	utility,	
respectively,	are	shown	in	Table	2.	 	 The	calculations	show	a	450-basis	point	difference	in	the	cost	of	
equity	between	the	smallest	and	largest	utility.	 	 The	dotted	line	in	Figure	6	estimates	the	relationship	
between	the	cost	of	equity	and	utility	size	across	the	spectrum	of	rural	utilities.	
Figure	6.	 	 Cost	of	Equity	Estimate	vs.	Annual	Sales	for	Rural	Alaska	Scale	Electric	Utilities	
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Table	2.	Illustrative	Examples	of	Duff	&	Phelps	2016	Valuation	Handbook	Cost	of	Equity	Estimates	
using	Build-Up	Method	1	extended	to	rural	Alaska	scale	electric	utilities	
	
	
Utilities	can	finance	their	capital	through	equity	(i.e.,	owner	investments)	or	debt	(such	as	bonds.)	 	 In	
large	utilities,	there	can	be	multiple	types	of	equity	(such	as	common	and	preferred	stock)	and	multiple	
forms	of	debt	(such	as	bank	loans,	government	loans,	and	bonds.)	 	 For	present	purposes,	it	is	sufficient	
to	consider	simply	the	two	basic	sources	of	capital,	debt	and	equity.	
The	total	cost	of	capital	is	the	weighted	sum	of	the	cost	of	equity	and	the	cost	of	debt:	
Total	cost	of	capital=	(%	equity)	x	(cost	of	equity)	+	(%	debt)	x	(cost	of	debt)	
Equity	costs	by	size	of	utility	were	estimated	above.	 	 The	cost	of	debt	and	the	debt	and	equity	
percentages	were	compiled	from	most	recent	Regulatory	Commission	filings	(2015,	2016),	including	PCE	
annual	reports,	annual	audited	financials,	simplified	rate	filings	(for	coops),	and	rate	cases	(for	
investor-owned	utilities).	 	 The	results	of	those	calculations	are	presented	in	Figure	7.	 	 	
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Figure	7.	 	 Weighted	Average	Cost	of	Capital	–	Rural	Alaska	Electric	Utilities	
	
	
The	combination	of	greater	reliance	on	debt	financing	and	the	lower	cost	of	equity	for	the	larger	
regional	coop	provides	significant	cost	of	capital	savings	as	compared	with	other	organizational	
structures	that	serve	small	to	mid-sized	rural	communities.	
To	understand	Figure	7,	let	us	look	specifically	at	the	village	scale	utilities	and	the	large	regional	coop.	 	
Our	sample	of	five	small	village-scale	utilities	was	taken	from	the	middle	of	the	small	village	size	
distribution	as	measured	by	kWh	per	year	in	sales.	 	 None	of	the	utilities	had	long-term	debt.	 	 A	
number	of	small	village	utilities	did	carry	outstanding	balances	on	their	fuel	loans	from	the	State	of	
Alaska,	but	this	short-term	financing	is	not	the	same	as	long-term	debt.	 	 Therefore,	our	sample	of	small	
utilities	is	100%	equity	financed.	 	 This	would	not	be	unusual	for	many	small	businesses,	which	do	not	
have	access	to	bond	financing	and	whose	risk	is	too	high	for	bank	financing.	 	 To	apply	the	cost	of	
capital	equation,	assume	a	bank	loan	rate	of	5%.	 	 With	100%	equity	financing,	the	cost	of	capital	is:	
Small	utility	cost	of	capital	=	100%	*	20.9%	+	0	%	*	5%	=	20.9%	
For	the	large	regional	coop,	the	estimated	cost	of	debt	financing	is	4%	and	the	company	is	financed	as	
66%	debt	and	33%	equity.	 	 This	yields	a	total	weighted	cost	of	capital	of	8.09%.	
Regional	utility	cost	of	capital	=	67%	*	4%	+	33%	*	16.4	=	8.09%	
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II.	C.	 	 Best	practices	in	utility	management	
This	final	sub-section	about	costs	of	different	types	of	utility	organization	in	rural	Alaska	addresses	the	
issue	of	internal	governance.	 	 By	internal	governance,	we	mean	issues	such	as	professional	
management	and	oversight	by	independent	governance	boards.	 	 These	issues	are	both	more	difficult	
to	measure	than	simply	the	cost	of	service	or	the	cost	of	capital	and	also	are	intertwined	with	those	two	
issues.	 	 A	more	professional	technical	management	can	make	operational	decisions	that	reduce	costs	
and	more	professional	financial	management	can	make	decisions	that	reduce	the	cost	of	financing.	
The	issue	of	the	effect	of	energy	subsidies	on	economic	performance	has	generated	significant	interest,	
including	a	2013	report	by	the	World	Bank	(L.	A.	Andrés,	J.	L.	Guasch,	and	J.	Schwartz	[editors].	2013.	
Uncovering	the	Drivers	of	Utility	Performance.)	 	 That	report	identified	four	“best	practices”	that	
promote	efficient	utility	performance:	
1. An	independent,	performance-driven	board	of	directors	
2. Professional	staff	
3. Transparent	measures	of	price,	performance,	and	management	
4. Clear	mechanisms	for	evaluating	performance	
The	World	Bank	analysis	does	suggest	some	steps	that	Alaska	might	take	to	promote	best	practices.	 	
For	example,	Alaska	could	require	periodic	Regulatory	Commission	of	Alaska	(RCA)	review	of	whether	
utilities	have	achieved	a	minimum	level	of	compliance	with	best	practice	as	a	threshold	for	the	PCE	
subsidy	eligibility.	 	 Statutory	authority	and	rulemaking	would	be	required	to	establish	the	minimum	
criteria	for	best	practice.	 	 Such	criteria	would	probably	go	beyond	simply	the	World	Bank	Drivers	of	
Utility	Performance.	 	 For	example,	a	minimum	working	capital	requirement,	such	as	45	days	of	cash	
balances,	might	be	appropriate	to	avoid	utilities	that	are	constantly	on	the	financial	brink.	 	 An	
alternative	to	a	strictly	regulatory	approach	might	be	to	provide	incentive	payments	from	the	PCE	
Endowment	for	PCE	communities	that	have	adopted	“exceptional”	levels	across	all	best	practices.	 	
Again,	this	would	likely	require	statutory	authority	and	rulemaking	to	establish	and	define	“exceptional“	
levels	of	best	management	practice.	
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III.	 	 Postage	stamp	rate	design	issues	for	PCE	communities	
	
Overview	
The	PCE	program	makes	energy	more	affordable	in	high-cost	areas.	 	 Depending	on	how	the	energy	
subsidies	are	funded,	they	can	have	impacts	on	the	total	cost	of	energy	services.	 	 When	electric	service	
is	subsidized	by	PCE,	the	lower	cost	of	electricity	encourages	consumers	to	use	more	electricity.	 	 To	a	
great	extent,	this	is	an	intentional	effect.	As	long	as	the	subsidy	for	the	lower	rates	comes	from	some	
type	of	government	program,	such	as	the	PCE	Endowment,	this	is	the	only	effect	on	customer	decisions.	 	
But	if	the	source	of	funds	for	the	subsidy	were	in	part	from	other	customers,	then	the	implicit	
cross-subsidy	also	creates	incentives	for	those	with	higher	rates	to	reduce	purchases	of	utility	electricity.	
Even	with	the	PCE	program,	there	remain	wide	differences	in	the	costs	of	electricity	across	rural	Alaska.	 	
One	proposal	to	reduce	these	differences	is	to	create	a	single	rate	for	electricity	for	some	set	of	
customers.	 	 These	uniform	rates	are	often	called	“postage	stamp	rates”,	which	borrows	the	post	office	
analogy	that	first-class	rates	are	uniform	regardless	of	where	you	live.	 	 Postage	stamp	rates	might	be	
applied	at	two	different	levels.	 	 First,	all	customers	of	a	certain	class	for	a	utility	might	be	charged	the	
same	rate.	 	 Thus,	for	regional	utilities	such	as	AVEC	and	APC,	there	might	be	a	postage	stamp	rate	for	
all	residential	customers.	 	 Or,	at	a	higher	level,	there	might	be	a	single	residential	rate	for	all	of	rural	
Alaska.	 	 Another	way	to	think	of	postage	stamp	rates	is	that	costs	are	shared	(or	averaged)	over	some	
set	of	customers.	 	 	
Incentives	under	postage	stamp	rates	
Postage	stamp	rates	are	implicitly	a	subsidy	to	higher-cost	customers	from	lower-cost	customers.	 	 The	
central	issue	is	how	this	subsidy	is	financed.	 	 There	are	three	broad	alternatives	to	finance	postage	
stamp	rates:	 	
1.	 	 By	a	redistribution	of	existing	PCE	subsidies	 	
2.	 	 By	raising	rates	for	the	same	class	of	customers	(usually,	residential	customers)	in	one	utility	
or	service	area	in	order	to	lower	rates	for	customers	in	the	same	class	at	another	utility	or	
service	area.	 	 When	this	cross-subsidization	occurs	within	a	single	utility,	such	as	among	
different	villages	in	a	regional	utility,	this	cross-subsidization	will	occur	as	internal	financial	
flows.	 	 When	the	cross-subsidization	occurs	across	different	utilities,	some	kind	of	payment	
from	the	low-cost	utility	to	the	high-cost	utility	is	required.	 	 This	is	typically	accomplished	by	
some	kind	of	government-run	pool	that	manages	the	collections	and	payments.	
3.	 	 By	raising	rates	of	one	class	of	customers	(e.g.,	commercial)	to	lower	the	rates	for	another	
class	of	customers	(e.g.,	residential.)	 	 As	with	approach	(2),	this	cross-subsidization	may	be	
within	a	single	utility	or	across	utilities	by	some	kind	of	pooling.	
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Some	combination	of	the	three	sources	of	financing	could	also	be	used.	 	 All	approaches	create	
incentives	that	should	be	understood.	
Any	of	the	three	approaches	can	result	in	weaker	incentives	for	each	utility	to	control	costs.	 	 If	high	
cost	utilities	get	either	higher	PCE	subsidies	or	payments	from	some	kind	of	pooling	of	revenues,	then	
the	utility	has	weaker	incentives	to	reduce	costs.	 	 Given	the	evidence	above	that	DCG&A	costs	vary	
widely	even	among	similar-size	utilities,	there	should	be	some	concern	that	postage	stamp	rates	will	
serve	to	support	low	productivity	utilities	at	the	expense	of	high	productivity	utilities.	
The	cross-subsidization	in	approaches	(2)	and	(3)	results	in	some	customers	paying	higher	rates	(relative	
to	the	unsubsidized	case)	and	some	customers	paying	lower	rates.	 	 Those	customers	paying	higher	
rates	therefore	have	greater	incentives	to	conserve	on	the	use	of	electricity	and	those	customers	paying	
lower	rates	have	incentives	to	use	relatively	more	electricity.	 	 From	a	utility	regulation	perspective,	the	
question	is	how	strong	are	the	incentives	to	alter	the	use	of	electricity.	 	 Much	of	that	depends	on	the	
alternatives	available	to	customers.	 	 For	example,	if	residential	customers	have	access	to	natural	gas,	
then	higher	electric	rates	will	encourage	them	to	switch	to	natural	gas	for	cooking,	heating	water,	and	
drying	clothes.	 	 Conversely,	low	electric	rates	can	encourage	the	residential	use	of	electricity	for	space	
heating.	 	 Commercial	customers,	in	general,	have	more	choices	when	faced	with	higher	electric	utility	
costs.	 	 The	question	of	what	happens	to	the	overall	level	of	use	of	electricity	is	important	because	
electric	utilities	often	have	large	fixed	costs	for	generation	and	distribution	that	do	not	vary	(or	do	not	
vary	much)	when	the	amount	of	electricity	used	changes.	 	 Decreases	in	electricity	use	due	to	higher	
rates	may	result	in	higher	costs	per	kWh	for	the	utility.	
This	reduction	in	use	of	utility-generated	electricity	can	be	especially	problematic	if	some	commercial	
customers	can	generate	their	own	electricity	at	lower	cost.	 	 In	this	case,	they	may	choose	to	leave	the	
electric	grid	to	self-generate,	which	is	called	“by-pass.”	 	 This	by-pass	will	typically	result	in	higher	total	
costs	for	the	system.	
To	understand	this	effect,	consider	a	simple	example.	Assume:	
n Community	A	has	electric	costs	of	$.30/kWh	and	generates	10,000	megawatt-hours	of	power	
per	year,	for	a	total	cost	of	$3	million.	
n Community	B	has	electric	costs	of	$.10/kWh	and	also	generates	10,000	megawatt-hours	of	
power	per	year	for	a	total	cost	of	$1	million.	
n Community	B	has	a	single	large	customer	that	uses	5,000	megawatt-hours	of	power	per	year	
from	the	utility,	but	could	self-generate	at	$.15/kWh.	
n For	simplicity,	assume	that	the	costs	per	kWh	do	not	vary	with	output	for	either	utility.	
The	total	cost	for	these	two	communities	is	$4	million.	 	 If	a	postage	stamp	rate	of	$.20/kWh	were	
imposed,	then	the	large	customer	would	choose	to	self-generate	at	a	cost	of	$750,000.	 	 That	would	
leave	$3.5	million	in	costs	for	the	utilities,	$3	million	in	community	A	and	$500,000	in	community	B.	 	
The	postage	stamp	rate	would	have	to	increase	to	$.233/kWh.	 	 The	total	cost	of	generating	the	20	
megawatt	hours	has	increased	to	$4.25	million,	due	to	the	incentive	for	inefficient	by-pass.	
	 22	 	
By-pass	is	not	a	theoretical	concept	in	rural	Alaska.	 	 The	costs	for	self-generation	for	large	commercial	
entities	and	even	some	government	facilities	can	easily	be	lower	than	the	utility	costs.	 	 This	is	because	
(a)	the	self-generator	is	often	using	similar	generating	equipment,	particularly	in	communities	that	
generate	using	diesel,	and	(b)	the	self-generator	does	not	have	to	maintain	distribution	lines	and	some	
overhead	services	(such	as	billing.)	 	 	
The	specific	design	of	a	postage	stamp	rate	will	determine	the	degree	to	which	by-pass	in	incentivized.	 	
If	the	PCE	program	only	provides	subsidies	to	residential	customers	and	only	increases	rates	for	other	
residential	customers,	then	incentives	for	commercial	by-pass	are	minimal.	 	 Each	utility	will	have	an	
incentive	to	set	commercial	rates	to	avoid	by-pass.	To	avoid	by-pass,	the	utilities	must	be	willing	and	
able	to	lower	its	rates	to	its	long	run	marginal	cost	of	providing	service	to	the	commercial	user.	 	 	
	
Alaska Power Company as illustrative postage stamp rate design example 
To	understand	how	a	postage	stamp	rate	might	work	in	some	region,	one	could	consider	the	case	of	the	
APC	communities.	
A	postage	stamp	rate	at	the	APC	average	rate	of	$.12/kWh	favors	high-cost	frontier	areas,	such	as	
Naukati,	Whale	Pass,	Allakaket,	Bettles,	Eagle,	Northway,	Slana,	Chistochina,	and	Mentasta,	which	pay	
$.22/kWh	to	$.27/kWh.	 	 This	will	implicitly	require	subsidies	from	the	rest	of	the	APC	communities	
(Craig,	Hydaburg,	Hollis,	Kasaan	and	Thorne	Bay),	and	raises	their	rates	by	33%,	from	the	current	
$.09/kWh	to	$.12/kWh.	 	 That	would	increase	the	risk	that	large	local	customers,	such	as	fish	processing	
plants,	will	choose	to	self-generate.	 	 This	could,	in	turn,	raise	the	postage	stamp	rate	above	$.12/kWh.	
Figure	8	looks	in	greater	detail	at	the	costs	for	groups	of	APC	communities.	 	 The	communities	are	
divided	by	their	source	of	generation,	which	is	a	major	determinant	of	differences	in	costs.	 	 For	each	
group	of	communities,	the	total	costs	are	broken	down	into	DCG&A	cost	and	power	production	
expense.	 	 That	breakdown	highlights	that	the	booked	cost	of	local	power	production	differs	by	a	factor	
of	almost	three,	while	the	DCG&A	costs	vary	only	from	$.07/kWh	to	$.09/kWh.	 	 The	difference	in	
power	production	costs	is	related	to:	 	 	
• Differences	in	access	to	local	resources	other	than	diesel.	 	 Notably,	APC	generation	has	
migrated	from	20%	hydro	to	70%-80%	hydro	over	15	years.	
• The	proportion	of	the	other-than-diesel	resource	that	has	been	financed	by	contributed	capital	
from	federal	and	state	grants	and	low	interest	loans.	
• Scale	economies	of	power	production	systems.	 	 Many	APC	communities	are	served	by	larger	
scale	diesel	generation	systems	and	central	hydro	resources	that	provide	power	to	a	local	island	
grid	(e.g.,	Prince	of	Wales	Island.)	 	 For	those	APC	communities	that	are	smaller	and	more	
widely	dispersed	and	that	depend	on	local	diesel	power	production,	the	power	production	cost	
profiles	are	at	or	well	above	the	aggregate	average	of	AVEC.	
• 	
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Figure	8:	 	 Regional	Rate	Group	vs.	Postage	Stamp	Rates
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IV.	Energy	Subsidy	Administration	
Using	direct	energy	subsidies	to	target	certain	disadvantaged	populations	is	relatively	limited	in	the	U.S.	 	
An	obvious	exception	would	be	the	Low-Income	Home	Energy	Assistance	Program	(LIHEAP.)	 	 Direct	
energy	subsidies	are	more	common	internationally.	 	 On	the	other	hand,	utility	rate-making	in	the	U.S.	
has	long	involved	various	kinds	of	cross-subsidies	in	rate	design,	including	lifeline	electricity	rates	and	
“increasing	block	rates”	that	charge	low	rates	for	the	first	several	hundred	kWh	used	per	month.	 	 The	
PCE	subsidy	is	decided	by	the	Regulatory	Commission	of	Alaska	and	then	financed	from	the	PCE	
Endowment.	 	 It	is	the	interaction	between	the	subsidy	elements	and	the	utility	regulatory	elements	
that	makes	postage	stamp	rates	relevant	to	PCE	policy.	
Direct	energy	subsidies	on	the	international	level	have	been	broadly	criticized.	 	 Two	recent	examples	
are	reports	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(D.	Coady,	I.	W.H.	Parry,	L.	Sears,	and	B.	Shang.	 	 2015.	
“How	Large	Are	Global	Subsidies?”	International	Monetary	Fund	Working	Paper	15/105)	and	by	the	
International	Energy	Agency	(International	Energy	Agency.	2015.	Energy	and	Climate	Change.	 	 A	World	
Energy	Outlook	Special	Report.)	 	 Those	two	reviews	find	that	energy	subsidies	are	large	(more	than	6%	
of	global	GDP)	and	that	they	are	usually	poorly	targeted.	Less	than	10%	of	the	benefits	accrue	to	poor	
households	that	face	challenges	in	paying	for	energy.	 	 These	reviews	conclude	that	the	money	could	be	
better	spent	on	roads,	hospitals,	and	schools,	if	the	goal	is	really	to	improve	the	welfare	of	the	lowest	
income	groups.	Another	recent	study	concluded	that	36%	of	CO2	emissions	where	associated	with	
energy	subsidies	(R.	Stefanski.	2014.	“Dirty	Little	Secrets:	Inferring	Fossil-Fuel	Subsidies	from	Patterns	in	
Emissions	Subsidies.”	 	 Oxford	Centre	for	the	Analysis	of	Resource	Rich	Economies	Research	Paper	134.)	
Development	aid	agencies,	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	frequently	
attempt	to	make	energy-subsidy	reform	a	component	of	financial	recovery	packages,	but	these	reforms	
are	notoriously	difficult	for	governments	to	enact.	 	
Underlying	the	criticisms	of	energy-subsidy	systems	are	two	arguments:	 	 First,	the	producers	of	energy	
vary	widely	in	their	efficiency.	 	 Subsidies	allow	inefficient	producers	to	avoid	consumer	criticism,	
because	subsidies	hide	the	inefficiency.	 	 Earlier	sections	of	this	report	suggest	that	utilities	in	rural	
Alaska	do	vary	widely	in	their	efficiency	in	the	delivery	of	distribution,	customer	service,	and	general	and	
administrative	functions.	 	 Second,	consumers	of	energy	have	many	options	in	the	use	of	energy,	and	
subsidies	create	inefficient	incentives	for	those	consumers.	 	 Subsidies	encourage	consumers	to	use	
higher	cost	(but	subsidized)	sources;	subsidies	reduce	the	pay-off	to	energy-saving	investments	such	as	
insulation	or	more	efficient	home	heating	systems;	and	subsidies	encourage	greater	use	of	energy.	 	 	
The	administration	of	an	energy	subsidy	program	faces	two	related	policy	issues.	 	 First,	what	is	the	
nature	of	the	trade-offs	between	achieving	the	goals	of	lowering	energy	costs	for	some	target	
population	and	the	incentives	that	are	created	for	inefficiency	in	production	and	consumption	of	
energy?	 	 This	is	an	inevitable	trade-off	in	any	energy	subsidy	program.	 	 But	the	second	question	is	
whether	it	is	possible	to	re-design	the	energy	subsidy	program	to	achieve	the	goals	of	lowering	energy	
costs	for	the	target	population	with	lower	fiscal	costs,	with	greater	efficiency	in	the	production	and	use	
of	energy,	and	perhaps	also	with	lower	environmental	impact.	
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Information	to	assess	efficiency	of	PCE	
This	section	examines	the	steps	Alaska	could	take	to	better	assess	the	efficiency	of	the	both	the	PCE	
program	and	also	the	combined	efficiency	of	energy	subsidy	programs,	including	the	PCE,	that	affect	
rural	Alaska.	 	 Transparency	in	the	information	about	the	PCE	program	and	other	energy	subsidy	
programs	is	the	main	issue.	We	suggest	five	standards	of	transparency	in	these	programs.	
1. Information	on	energy	subsidies	and	on	the	costs	of	utilities	receiving	energy	subsidies	should	be	
transparent.	
The	AEA	annual	report	on	PCE	support,	with	data	by	utility	on	cost	and	price	support,	provides	the	
data	on	which	any	assessment	of	the	PCE	must	rely.	 	 A	companion	ISER	report	on	the	cost	of	
electricity	in	rural	Alaska	demonstrated	that,	in	a	number	of	cases,	the	information	filed	with	RCA	
(for	subsidy	determination)	is	not	consistent	with	information	in	the	AEA	annual	reports.	 	 Part	(but	
not	all)	of	the	issue	is	differences	in	accounting	for	grants	and	low-interest	loans	for	infrastructure.	 	
There	are	also	issues	about	how	well	either	the	RCA	or	AEA	data	is	suited	to	questions	like	the	
efficiency	of	fuel-saving	investments.	 	 Sources	of	power	other	than	diesel	typically	involve	larger	
capital	costs,	and	assessing	the	efficiency	of	such	investments	requires	a	present-value	comparison	
of	the	higher	investment	costs	and	future	reductions	in	generation	costs.	 	 While	the	annual	costs	of	
power	production	are	reported,	the	costs	of	capital	for	power	generation	are	generally	not	
separated	from	other	capital	expenditures.	 	 Separating	capital	costs	into	generating	and	
non-generating	assets	would	be	very	useful.	
2. 	 Information	on	energy	subsidies	should	be	integrated	across	programs.	
The	PCE	program	is	not	the	only	energy	subsidy	program	for	rural	Alaska.	 	 The	LIHEAP	program	also	
subsidizes	energy	costs,	and	various	state	and	federal	programs	subsidize	capital	costs.	 	 There	are	
two	different	issues	about	how	these	programs	interact.	 	 On	the	consumer	side,	there	is	the	
question	of	how	well	the	various	energy	subsidy	programs	interact	to	cover	vulnerable	populations	
without	providing	duplicative	subsidies.	 	 On	the	producer	side,	there	is	the	question	of	how	the	
various	state	and	federal	grants	and	low-interest	loans	interact	with	the	PCE	subsidy-determination	
process	and	with	the	rate-making	process	for	investor-owned	utilities.	 	 LIHEAP,	the	Alaska	Housing	
Finance	Corporation,	and	USDA	Rural	Utility	Services	should	consider	working	with	AEA	to	produce	
an	Alaska	Energy	Subsidy	Programs	comprehensive	report	that	collates	data	on	the	various	subsidies	
by	program,	by	community,	by	utility,	and	by	impact	on	household	affordability.	 	 	
3. Information	on	quality	of	service	by	utilities	receiving	PCE	should	be	transparent.	 	 	
An	important	element	of	electric	service	provision	is	reliability.	 	 Reliability	is	not	only	a	
convenience	issue,	but	also	a	safety	issue	(e.g.,	for	customers	using	home	health	equipment.)	The	
AEA	annual	report	on	PCE	could	consider	adding	customer	outage	data.	 	 For	non-reporting	utilities,	
AEA	could	consider	sampling	to	establish	proxy	values	on	quality.	 	 	
4. Energy	subsidies	should	be	assessed	to	determine	how	well	they	are	targeted	to	those	households	
and	communities	that	have	energy	affordability	challenges.	
Measuring	the	targeting	of	energy	subsidies	has	inherent	challenges	in	light	of	the	well-known	
challenges	in	measuring	median	household	income	for	small	remote	rural	communities	in	Alaska.	 	
Rather	than	trying	to	measure	income	each	year,	it	may	make	sense	to	use	the	American	
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Community	Survey	5-year	Median	Household	Income	or	the	proportion	of	households	that	are	
eligible	for	the	federal	free	and	reduced	lunch	program.	 	 The	AEA	annual	report	on	PCE	could	
measure	subsidy	efficiency	by	the	percent	of	PCE	support	attributable	to	the	cost	of	reducing	
electricity	payments	to	some	target	fraction	of	median	household	income	(such	as	2	percent)	for	
each	community	served.	
While	it	is	important	to	recognize	the	inherent	challenges	in	such	measurements,	that	should	not	be	
an	excuse	for	avoiding	the	issue	of	how	well	energy	subsidies	are	targeted.	 	 The	international	
evidence	indicates	that	energy	subsidies	often	fail	to	achieve	equity	goals.	 	 We	should	want	to	
know	if	the	current	PCE	subsidy-determination	process	favors	relatively	poorer	or	relatively	richer	
communities.	
5. Energy	subsidies	should	measure	the	extent	to	which	they	support/encourage	energy	technologies	
associated	with	high	CO2	(global	health)	and	high	PM2.5	emissions	(local	health.)	
The	AEA	Annual	Report	on	PCE	could	include	estimates	of	CO2	and	PM	2.5	emissions	per	kWh	and	in	
total.	 	 The	effects	of	other	subsidy	programs	(LIHEAP,	AHFC,	and	DOA-RUS)	on	CO2	and	PM	2.5	
emissions	could	also	be	reported.	
	
V.	 	 Summary	 	
The	executive	summary	at	the	beginning	of	this	report	provides	a	detailed	summary.	Here	we	note	three	
over-arching	points	that	emerge	from	this	analysis:	
1. Differences	in	distribution,	customer	service,	and	general	and	administrative	expenses	explain	a	
surprising	large	share	of	differences	in	the	cost	of	electric	service	in	rural	Alaska.	 	 It	is	possible	
to	achieve	greater	economies	in	those	costs	through	better	incentives	and	through	
consolidation	in	the	industry.	 	 Consolidation	would	also	have	beneficial	effects	for	the	cost	of	
capital.	
	
2. Using	postage	stamp	rates	to	reduce	the	variation	in	electric	rates	in	rural	Alaska	has	two	risks.	 	
First,	it	dilutes	the	incentives	for	efficiency	in	production.	 	 Second,	careful	rate	design	is	
required	to	avoid	causing	users	able	to	generate	their	own	electricity	to	bypass	the	utilities.	
	
3. Transparency	in	both	the	operation	of	individual	utilities	and	in	the	operation	of	energy-subsidy	
programs	is	essential	if	we	want	to	reduce	the	costs	of	providing	electric	service	in	rural	Alaska.	
